MER - Washington - 31 March:
     Just as there is military manuevering and planning, so there are similar counterparts in the political arena.
     The Israelis want out of Lebanon.  They're bleeding abit too much it seems.
     Having failed to political twist Lebanon to their designs, having failed to co-opt Syria into the hegemonic  "peace process", having failed to bludgeon Hezbollah to death, the same Israelis that have been invading Lebanon for decades now want out.  But on their terms. Terms neither Hezbollah, nor the Lebanese Government, nor the  Syrians, are likely to give them.
     And others players are using the opportunity to further their own designs and interests in the region.
     This interesting analysis from Global Intelligence Updates.
 

The Israelis have now publicly conceded that negotiations are underway with Hezbollah leaders, using the good offices of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk.  Member of Knesset, Yosi Beilin, described the procedure on the Israeli program "Meet the Press," aired on Channel 2 TV in Jerusalem.  While denying that he was engaged in direct discussion, Beilin described how messages were passed back and forth.

Beilin said, "Yes, I meet European elements.  I have met the UN secretary- general twice on this issue.  I meet many people who in turn meet Syrian, Lebanese and Hezbollah elements, but I don't meet these elements themselves.  I don't meet Syrians or Hezbollah people who are unwilling to meet us... Look, it is not a matter of negotiation.  If however, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk meets me in Jerusalem one day and meets Nasrallah the next, and if I try to explain to him how I see the withdrawal from Lebanon and he relates to me the positions of the other side, this is certainly a way to understand the situation better."

There has been little doubt over the past months, as Israel has pressed forward with its proposal to withdraw from Lebanon provided the Syrians were to agree and permit the Lebanese army to take control of this region, that discussions were proceeding with several parties.  The key party here has been Hezbollah, directly controlled not by Syria, but by Iran.  It is almost a certainty that the Lebanese Army could not control Hezbollah if it chose not to be controlled.  The Syrians could control Hezbollah, but the presence of the Syrian Army so close to Israel's northern border would destroy the deal from the Israeli point of view. Therefore, the missing piece has been confidence-building between Israel and Hezbollah.  This has been extremely difficult, since Israel cannot negotiate directly with what is officially a terrorist group, while Hezbollah cannot possibly accept the existence of Israel.  Nevertheless, the Middle East is nothing if not a practical place, so Israel and Hezbollah must have been talking for plans to be as far along as they are.

Beilin's description gives us a sense of the negotiating process. First, a Labor MK is doing the talking, giving the Netanyahu government lausible deniability.  Second, and most interesting, the Russians have
been serving as intermediaries.  Third, not discussed but quite evident, the Russians have also been back-checking the Hezbollah position with Hezbollah's Iranian bosses.  Since Russian and Iranian officials meet with great regularity, there has been ample opportunity for the Russians to sound out the Iranians on their views, making certain that these views coincide with Hezbollah's and that everyone is reading from the same page. For its part, Hezbollah is publicly making it clear that, while it is not talking with the Israelis and will not be responsible for enforcing any agreement, it does not see itself in opposition to a withdrawal, provided it is not required to provide guarantees.  Instead, it has focused on the status of the South Lebanese Army, a Christian, pro-Israeli force whose status and future in the region is the stickiest problem.  Hezbollah has gone so far as to say that while it will hold members of the SLA responsible, it will not hold their families responsible.  This clears the way for SLA members to be taken to Israel while the Christian community remains intact.

Two strategic issues emerge from all this.  First, Russia has emerged as the honest broker in this conversation.  For all the frantic activity of Albright and Ross, it is the Russians at this point who have clear access to Syria, Hezbollah and Iran.  The Israelis are therefore relying more on Russia to deliver messages than on the United States.  Indeed, as the U.S. peace effort picks up steam again, we believe that one of the reasons behind Beilin's interview was to signal the United States that it is not as vital to the peace process as Washington might think, and that Posuvalyuk is more effective than Ross.

Second, it seems clear to us that Iran is not opposed to a Lebanese settlement, or these conversations would have ended long ago.  Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Khalli this weekend in Damascus and then met with Syrian President Assad, dismissing Israeli efforts to withdraw from southern Lebanon as a trick. Iran is trying to portray the withdrawal as a defeat for Israel rather than as a mutually arrived at solution.  Nevertheless, it is clear that, atmospherics aside, Iran is not vetoing the withdrawal plan.

Thus, the Iranian diplomatic offensive continues to roll on.  While its opening to Saudi Arabia has been put on hold while OPEC holds its meetings and the Hajj runs its course, the basic effect has been to
limit U.S. influence in the Kingdom while increasing its own dramatically.  Now Iran is opening the door to improvements in its relations, at least indirectly, with Israel.  The Iranian policy focuses on keeping the Untied States off-balance in the region, and limiting its freedom of action.  By permitting the Russians to broker a deal with Hezbollah, a deal that must ultimately be signed off on in Teheran, Iran continues its adroit policy of rolling back American influence.

By giving away very little, Iran has used Russia to increase its own importance.  Simultaneously, Russia and Iran have decreased the direct consequentiality of American diplomacy.  The Israelis are signaling the
Americans about their declining relevance to the peace process, but with the President focusing on marginal issues in Africa, it is not clear that anyone in Washington is home to get the message.

* Global Intelligence Updates, alert@statfor.com, 3/30/98