MER - Washington - 2/24/98:
 
    Recently we published an extensive interview with the world-renowned political analyst Professor Noam Chomsky.

   Chomsky was subsequently interviewed again, a few days ago on February 19th.  With "Desert Thunder" now on-hold, but likely to go forward at some point in the future, understanding the background
and complexity to today's situation in the Middle East is of more importance than ever.

 
    1) Will a conflict between US (and allies) with Iraq be a further and perhaps disastrous step in marking out a coming conflict between the West and Islam? Does America's boldness flow from the weakness of Russia?

PROFESSOR NOAM CHOMSKY:

    Caution is in order in speaking of "a coming conflict between the West and Islam." The lines of conflict cut rather differently, and a good part of such rhetoric gives a distorted version of long-standing conflicts between Western power and independent nationalism in the South, often taking new forms.

    Consider some cases.  The most populous Islamic state in the world is Indonesia, which shifted from enemy to friend when General Suharto took power, presiding over an enormous slaughter that elicited great satisfaction in the West.  Since then Suharto has been "our kind of guy," as the Clinton administration
described him, while carrying out murderous aggression and endless atrocities against his own people.  Indonesia will again become an enemy if it steps out of line.  The most extreme fundamentalist Islamic state in the world is Saudi Arabia, long a close US ally; its status too will shift if it tries to go its own way.  Among non-governmental actors, it would be hard to find more fanatic Islamic fundamentalists than the segments of the resistance to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan that were strongly supported by the US.  Prior to August 1990, Saddam Hussein was a favored friend and trading partner of the US and UK -- "our kind of guy," not part of the "conflict between the West and Islam."

    All of this has been going on for a long time.  To take one critical moment, in March 1958 Secretary of State Dulles informed the National Security Council that the US faced three major world crises: the Middle East, North Africa, and Indonesia, all in the Islamic world.  He also insisted, with the "vigorous" endorsement of President Eisenhower, that the USSR was not involved, even obliquely.

    That brings us to the second part of the question.  The disappearance of Soviet power surely allows the US and Britain more freedom to resort to military force.  That has long been clear.  In a review of security issues for the New York Times in December 1988, Dimitri Simes, senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, observed that decline of concern over "Soviet counterattack" would "liberate American foreign policy from the straight jacket imposed by superpower hostility," making "military power more useful as a United States foreign policy instrument... against those who contemplate
challenging important American interests." He mentioned Nicaragua, Cuba, and OPEC to illustrate the opportunities for "greater reliance on military force in a crisis." The point was reiterated by former Undersecretary of State Elliott Abrams when the US invaded Panama a year later; resort to force is more
feasible than in the past, he commented, with the deterrent removed.  A few months later, the Bush Administration made its annual presentation to Congress calling for a huge Pentagon budget, including maintenance of the intervention forces that could now be used with less concern.  These had been aimed
primarily at the Middle East, where the "threats to our interests" that require military engagement "could not be laid at the Kremlin's door" -- or at the door of Iraq, still a friend and ally in March 1990.  There are many other examples.  Thus in secret discussions with top planners during the Cuban missile crisis, the Kennedy brothers expressed concern that Castro might use the missiles to deter US military intervention in Venezuela, so that "The Bay of Pigs was really right," JFK observed.

    In 1990, the US/UK would not have risked deploying half a million men in the desert if the USSR has still been a factor.  The same is true of subsequent use of force.
 

2) Does military action lack UN sanction and will it be an act of war?
 
    The resort to force not only lacks UN sanction, but is strongly opposed by the people of the region, and apparently by the Iraqi democratic opposition.  The last comment I have to qualify.  I know of their views only from the foreign press; as before, during, and after the Gulf War they remain virtually barred from US media, in keeping with Washington's stand, announced again in mid-March 1991 when the State Department explained that "Political meetings with [Iraqi democrats] would not be appropriate for our policy at this time." The time was 14 March 1991, as Saddam was decimating the opposition under the
eyes of General Schwartzkopf and the US was even denying captured Iraqi arms to rebelling military officers.

    One might contrive a tortured legal argument holding that the use of force is justified by Iraqi failure to meet the cease-fire conditions, so that Resolution 678 (29 Nov. 1990) is "reinvoked."  Doubts about the matter could readily be resolved by a US/UK request for endorsement of their plans by Security Council, but that option has not been pursued.  The framework of international law is reasonably clear.  Use of force is barred unless properly authorized by the Security Council (with exceptions that do not apply here).

    But these considerations have little real world relevance.  Washington's position was admirably summarized by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, then UN Ambassador, when she informed
the Security Council during an earlier US confrontation with Iraq that the US will act "multilaterally when we can and unilaterally as we must," because "We recognize this area as vital to US national interests" and therefore recognize no external constraints.  That position apparently stands, as Washington's reaction to Kofi Annan's mission makes clear enough. "We wish him well," Albright stated, "and when he comes back we will see what he has brought and how it fits with our national interest," which will determine how we respond.

    Washington's contempt for international law is revealed as well by its interpretations of the UN Charter, as when the Reagan Administration justified its bombing of Libya as "self-defense against future attack," or when the Clinton Administration justified a missile attack on Baghdad on grounds of "self-defense" against alleged Iraqi involvement in an attempt to assassinate George Bush months earlier.  The absurdity is patent, even without knowledge of the wording of Article 51 of the Charter, authorizing self-defense against armed attack under narrow conditions.  To take another highly relevant case, consider Washington's reaction to the demand by the UN Security Council (Dec. 1975) that Indonesia withdraw immediately from East Timor and that all states "respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination." The US, later joined by Britain, reacted by
sending new arms to the aggressors, accelerating the arms flow once again as the attack reached near-genocidal levels in 1978, while in his memoirs Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan took
pride in having rendered the UN "utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook" in accord with the instructions of the State Department, which "wished things to turn out as they did and worked to bring this about." The US/UK also cheerfully endorse the robbery of East Timor's oil in violation of any reasonable interpretation of solemn conventions.  The analogy to Iraq/Kuwait is close, though there are differences: to mention only the most obvious, US-backed atrocities in East Timor were -- very quickly -- far beyond anything attributed to Saddam Hussein in Kuwait.

    Great powers rely on the rule of force, though they are happy to invoke the rule of law as a weapon against others.  On that, the historical record is sufficiently clear.
 

3) Is there such a thing as rogue states and if so what can be done about them?
 
    There surely are states that engage in international terrorism and aggression.  One has even been condemned by the World Court for the "unlawful use of force," ordered to desist and pay reparations.  It responded by escalating the crimes and vetoing a UN Security Council resolution calling on all states to
observe international law, later forcing the victim to withdraw its claims for reparations.  The record is long and ugly.

    Iraq certainly qualifies as a leading criminal state.  Defending the US plan to attack Iraq at a televised public meeting on 18 February, Secretaries Albright and Cohen rightly stressed the fact that Saddam had even gone so far as "using weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors as well as his own people," his most awesome crime.  They failed only to note -- and commentators have been kind enough not to point out -- that those horrifying acts did not turn Iraq into a "rogue state." Rather, the US and UK continued their strong support for Saddam, and there were no passionate calls for a military strike against the perpetrator of the crimes.  When ABC TV correspondent Charles Glass revealed some sites of Saddam's biological warfare programs, Washington simply denied the facts, and the story died.  It was not his massive crimes that elevated Saddam to the rank of "Beast of Baghdad."

    The concept "rogue state" is highly nuanced.  Thus Cuba has been a "rogue state" because of its alleged involvement in international terrorism, but the US does not fall into the category despite an extraordinary record of terrorist attacks against Cuba for close to 40 years, apparently continuing through last summer according to a plausible interpretation of important investigative reporting of the Miami Herald, which failed to reach the national press.  Cuba was a "rogue state" when its military forces were in Angola, backing the government against South African attacks supported by the US.  South Africa, in contrast, was not a rogue state then, nor during the Reagan years, when it caused over $60 billion in damage and 1.5 million deaths in neighboring states according to a UN Commission, not to speak of some events at home -- and with ample US/UK support.  Indonesia was not a rogue state when it massacred its own
population, nor when it invaded East Timor in defiance of Security Council resolutions, carrying out what may be the worst slaughter relative to population since the Holocaust.

    The criteria are fairly clear: a "rogue state" is not simply a criminal state, but one that defies the orders of the powerful.

    There are many ways to respond to the threat of criminal and dangerous states, some quite simple.  One option is to accept the rule of law; the US could have chosen to accept the World Court judgment, to mention only one obvious example.  Another is to stop supporting their crimes, as in the case of Iraq (pre-Kuwait) and Indonesia, among many others.  The framework of international law provides many means, including diplomatic options that are rarely exhausted and often simply avoided; and also the ultimate use of force when properly authorized.  Each case has to be considered in its own terms.
 

4) Do you accept the picture of Saddam painted by Western propaganda, as the brutal head of a barbarous regime?
 
    The word "accept" is not quite accurate.  Rather I am pleased that "Western propaganda" has finally agreed to join me (and many others) in accepting the picture, instead of denying it or choosing to ignore the facts, including readily available evidence about Western support for Saddam's crimes.
 

5) If he is a threat to world peace, what should be done about him?
 
    As noted, there are a variety of legitimate ways to react to the many threats to world peace.  If Iraq's neighbors feel threatened, they can proceed, with the support of others, to call on the UN Security Council to authorize appropriate measures to respond to the threat.  If Britain feels threatened, it can follow the same course.  But the US and UK have no authority to make their own determinations on these matters and to act as they choose -- and would have no such authority even if their own hands were clean, hardly the case.

    In the current situation, there are numerous options.  To mention one, the proposals of the Iraqi Democratic Opposition should surely be taken very seriously, rather than simply dismissed.  How realistic they are, I cannot judge.  And I do not think we can know as long as the US remains committed -- as apparently it still is -- to the preference for "an iron-fisted Iraqi junta," without Saddam Hussein if possible, a return to the days when Saddam's "iron fist... held Iraq together, much to the satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia," not to speak of Washington (NY Times chief diplomatic correspondent Thomas Friedman, 7 July 1991).
 

6) What do you think would happen if the UN packed up its tent and he was left alone?

    I would certainly not advise that.  Saddam would then subject Iraqis to greater violence and repression while pursuing his weapons programs without interference.  These might also be consequences of military strikes, as US military analysts and others have warned.  An attack might end the inspection system,
which, though seriously hampered by Saddam's interference, has eliminated a large part of his weapons stock, far more than the 1991 bombings did.  An attack might also gain regional support for the brutal dictator, not exactly a welcome consequence.

 
7) What, if any, are the connections between US economic interests and the threatened action against Saddam?
 
    There are connections, but they are indirect, and are not the immediately operative factors.  Nor, in my opinion, were they in 1990-91.  Since World War II, the US has been firmly committed to maintaining control over Middle East oil, which the State Department described as "a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history."  But there is no persuasive evidence that in 1990-91 the US was concerned about an Iraqi threat to this control.  There is, however, good reason to believe that Washington saw the Iraqi invasion as an opportunity to extend its control -- to demonstrate that "what we say goes," as George Bush announced triumphantly while the missiles and bombs were falling.  These are crucial considerations, but in the background.
 

8) Britain's Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has hinted at the use of nuclear weapons if Saddam uses chemical weapons. What is your reaction?
 
    The proposal is too shocking for comment.
 

9) The Iraqi people are hungry, in many instances starving. What responsibility does the UN have for this situation?

    The sanctions have taken a terrible toll on the Iraqi people, while leaving Saddam unaffected, possibly even strengthened as potential resistance is undermined among people struggling to survive.  Washington's not so subtle support for his crushing of the March 1991 rebellion surely had the same effect.  Today,
senior UN and other international relief officials in Iraq warn that bombing might have a "catastrophic" effect on people already suffering miserably, and might terminate the humanitarian operations that have brought at least some relief.

    One might question, however, whether the awesome human costs of these policies are properly termed a "UN responsibility." The US and Britain have taken the lead in blocking aid programs -- for example, delaying approval for ambulances on the grounds that they could be used to transport troops.  Meanwhile, western diplomats point out, "The US had directly benefited from [the humanitarian] operation as much, if not more, than the Russians and the French," for example, by purchase of $600 million worth of Iraqi oil (second only to Russia) and sale by US companies of $200 million in humanitarian goods to Iraq.

    Saddam Hussein remains a monster and a serious threat, as he was while he conducted his most awful crimes with US/UK support.  But the reaction of his former backers reeks of cynicism and hypocrisy.  And their current designs -- even putting aside elementary considerations of international law -- may well make a terrible situation even worse.