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MID-EAST REALITIES - www.MiddleEast.Org - Washington - 6/07/00: The following commentary by Robert Fisk appears in the upcoming issue of THE NATION dated 26 June:
SOUTHERN LEBANON WAITS
By Robert Fisk*
"After hearing that, do they think I
want to send my [U.N.] soldiers to
southern Lebanon?"
U.N. Officer
"It is not the Lebanese Army's job to
protect Israel's northern border. Nor
is it the United Nations'."
[Kefer Kila, Southern Lebanon - THE NATION - 26 June 2000]"
The final confrontation between Hezbollah and Israeli troops will stand
alongside Anwar Sadat’s 1977 arrival in Jerusalem and the extraordinary
handshake (fatal for Yitzhak Rabin and perhaps for Yasir Arafat too)
on the
White House lawn in 1993. In southern Lebanon in May, after all the
years of
bestializing every Islamic enemy as a “mindless terrorist,” Israelis
found the
bearded, armed members of the Party of God on their frontier.
Right up against the border fence. Standing next to the gunmen, I was
amazed
to see how awed they were by their own victory. One of the world’s
smallest
guerrilla forces had driven one of the world’s most powerful armies
out of
an entire country.
The Hezbollah, it seemed to me, were as amazed at history’s power as
the
Israelis. I asked one of them - a red-faced, bearded man with an M-16-what
he
was thinking as he looked over at the Jewish settlement of Mishgav
Am.
“Incredible,” he said.
And he was right. Inevitably, US and Israeli journalists recalled the
fall of
Saigon and the collapse of the South Vietnamese Army. In just two days,
Israel’s Lebanese surrogates, the ragtag South Lebanon Army, had fallen
to
pieces.
But the parallel was preposterous. In South Vietnam the national army
fought on alone for years with, in its initial stages, high morale.
But
Israel’s SLA militia fought for money-$400 a month, often paid in fake
$100
bills. And they fought because they were blackmailed into service-brothers
and
sisters would be jailed in the notorious Israeli torture prison at
Khiam if
their siblings did not enlist. And they fought because they had collaborated
with Israel in the past and had no other future in Lebanon.
Once the Israelis decided to leave, the SLA’s disintegration was inevitable.
It never had a cause to fight for. The SLA was not, as a general once
boasted,
the “shield of Galilee.” Nor was Israel’s so-called security zone secure.
It
was a myth. The SLA fell apart like a gang of mercenaries in central
Africa.
Comparisons with Vietnam are as dangerous as they are childish. The
bearded
images staring through the frontier wire were, alas for the Israelis,
the
authentic face of southern Lebanon. Many belonged to young Hezbollah
men
displaced from their homes in the south during Israel’s military adventures
in
Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. Hundreds of them were embracing family members
for
the first time in more than a decade.
And right now, it seems, the Lebanese government is in no mood to send
its
entire army into the south of the country-nor to sanction a massive
UN
deployment.
There are several reasons for this. The government in Beirut sees
no reason its soldiers should act as a sandbag for the Israelis. It
is not the
Lebanese Army’s job to protect Israel’s northern border. Nor is it
the United
Nations’. Had Israel abided by UN Resolution 425 when it was passed
twenty-two
years ago, things might have been different.
And then there is Golan. All along, Syria has insisted that the “peace
process” among Syria, Lebanon and Israel should be “two-track.” Even
the
Americans went along with that. An Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon,
the
Syrians said, must be matched by a withdrawal from the Syrian Golan
Heights.
And Syria’s pressure point for such a joint retreat was in southern
Lebanon:
Bleed the Israelis in their Crusader-style forts east of the Mediterranean,
and they would have to concede Golan as well as southern Lebanon.
That was President Hafez al-Assad’s equation. Golan remained quiet,
the 1973
battle lines frozen. The Syrians could regard southern Lebanon’s battle
as
theirs-with the advantage that it was the Lebanese rather than the
Syrians who
suffered on the Arab side. Now the Israelis have left. Golan-glimmering
gray
with dirty white streaks of snow to the east of Lebanon-seems as isolated
politically as it is geographically. Why should the Israelis leave
Golan now
that they have left Lebanon? No one is shooting at the Israeli soldiers
on Golan.
Already, a member of the Syrian Parliament has suggested that “resistance”
should begin on Golan. But this is a canard. Syria is not going to
provoke
Israeli attacks on Damascus. Nor is Hezbollah going to liberate Jerusalem.
When its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, urged the Palestinians to follow
Hezbollah’s example and take their destiny in their own hands, he was
telling
the Palestinians that they cannot expect Hezbollah’s help.
Much more disturbing are the fears of the southern Lebanese themselves
- and
of the Hezbollah who live there. There are rumors of disturbances to
come:
Lebanese troops now maintain checkpoints on every road north, searching
for
shells, explosives, guns. Hezbollah officials admitted to me recently
that
they are deeply concerned that “provocations” might be attempted in
the newly
liberated territories. It’s not difficult to see, for example, how
a car bomb
in a southern Lebanese city like Nabatiyah could be presented as the
work of
“Israeli agents” and provoke a response from the Hezbollah or from
less
disciplined militias. It’s easy to see how some small Palestinian
group-perhaps linked to Damascus-could initiate a lone cross-border
raid,
however suicidal, that would provoke an Israeli attack.
Even now, the Lebanese authorities, who remain host to 21,000 Syrian
soldiers,
are bickering over the exact border between Lebanon and Israel. What
about the
Shabaa Farms, they are asking, the small tract of land taken by Israel
during
its 1967 offensive against Syria? Why hasn’t Israel withdrawn from
them too?
The UN will have none of this. If the farms are Lebanese territory,
it says,
the Lebanese-Syrian border was too poorly defined to prove it. Yet
the dispute
over a few square acres of arable land could delay Lebanon’s decision
to
deploy UN troops in the south.
And we all know why. Southern Lebanon may be liberated, but it is not
safe.
And it may still provide a battleground for other people’s wars. The
Hezbollah
would like to consolidate their victory as a platform for autumn’s
parliamentary elections. They would like to represent the Shiites of
Lebanon.
The Lebanese civilians would like to enjoy their liberty.
But as long as the Israelis stay on Golan, the Syrians will see no advantage
in giving Israel an easy life behind the border with Lebanon. Damascus
has
said that it supports the UN there but added that it was “not responsible”
for any events that followed liberation.
As a UN officer commented cynically, “After hearing that, do they think
I
want to send my soldiers to southern Lebanon?”
*Robert Fisk, Middle East correspondent for the London Independent,
has lived
in Beirut since 1976.
Robert Fisk was extensively interviewed for an exclusive series
of four
MER-TV PROGRAMS three years ago. He discussed in the most
candid terms
the realities of the Middle East "peace
process" and the Qana massacre
that had taken place the previous year
and about which he obtained
exclusive video unmasking the Israeli
coverup by showing an Israeli
drone aircraft actually flying over the massacre scene and broadcasting
it in real-time to the Israeli army. The series of four
half-hour
programs, including the exclusive video, is available by emailing
to:
MERTV@MiddleEast.Org
For more information go to: http://www.MiddleEast.Org/fisk.htm
For more articles by Fisk go to: http://www.MiddleEast.Org/search.htm
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