<![CDATA[
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
Bush needs to calm his own warring factions
<br>Foreign editor's briefing by Bronwen Maddox
<br>The Times (London)
<br>
<br>June 14, 2002
<br>IT IS a peculiar state of affairs when the United States' allies,
<br>and enemies, have to try to guess the outcome of the internal
<br>battles of the Bush Administration in order to discern its foreign
<br>policy.
<br>The trouble now is that there isn't really a policy. The broad lines
<br>of the Administration's intentions had been clear from September 11
<br>to at least January 29, when President Bush gave his State of the
<br>Union address, denouncing the "axis of evil".
<br>Now they are blurred, by months of infighting between his advisers,
<br>which the President has seemed unwilling or unable to resolve.
<br>We are told that next week Bush will give a speech outlining his
<br>intentions towards the Middle East. But one reason it is necessary,
<br>and its content is so much in doubt, is that he has been apparently
<br>so willing to be buffetted around by his competing advisers. When
<br>Bush first assembled his team, many rushed to compliment him on the
<br>quality of his choices. He might not have much experience in foreign
<br>policy, they said, but at least he had brought in people who did.
<br>There is no doubt that this has proved true. From September 11 until
<br>at least the end of November, when the fighting in Afghanistan
<br>lessened, the war belonged to the Defence Secretary, Donald
<br>Rumsfeld,omnipresent on American television screens. Condoleezza
<br>Rice, the National Security Adviser and a Russian expert, then
<br>helped choreograph the complicated, unpredictable and crucial
<br>relationship with President Putin. The Bush team was united on its
<br>aims.
<br>It doesn't look that simple anymore. Once the fiercest of the Afghan
<br>fighting cooled, the war within the team began. The biggest split,
<br>of course, is the one that divides the Secretary of State, Colin
<br>Powell, from his colleagues, but even that is not quite as clear-cut
<br>as it is often painted.
<br>The caricature which is now commonplace would have it that Powell
<br>stands on one side of an abyss, with heartfelt but ineffectual
<br>support from his deputy, Richard Armitage, and about three quarters
<br>of the State Department. Ranged against him in the battle for Bush's
<br>ear are the hawks: Rumsfeld, the Vice-President, Dick Cheney, and
<br>the Pentagon, with muted support from Rice. They have the backing of
<br>a shrill, harsh chorus from the conservatives: Paul Wolfowitz, the
<br>Deputy Defence Secretary, and the defence adviser Richard Perle.
<br>This is true up to a point. There is no question that Powell is
<br>isolated; this week has demonstrated it more brutally than at any
<br>point in the Administration.
<br>On Monday, after meeting Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister,
<br>Bush slapped down all the strands of a Middle East policy associated
<br>with Powell in a few quick remarks -- essentially, the commitment to
<br>trying to restart a peace process. He seemed to embrace the views of
<br>the hawks, namely that dealing with Yassir Arafat, the Palestinian
<br>leader, is a waste of time.
<br>Next week's speech by the President will show whether any fragment
<br>of Powell's views on the Middle East has been preserved in the
<br>Administration's policy. State Department officials say privately
<br>that Powell supporters are deeply demoralised. Their chief, well
<br>known for his resilience, may be able to keep sanguine under this
<br>pressure, but that is a feat fewer of his staff are managing.
<br>Why is he staying? Some conservatives close to the Administration
<br>reckon that Bush takes advantage of his loyalty as a "good soldier",
<br>willing to serve his Commander-in-Chief as long as he is wanted. On
<br>this argument, the hawks can assume that Powell is not going to
<br>quit. The more sophisticated version of this, again from
<br>conservatives, is that Powell is useful, in fact essential, to Bush
<br>because he reassures liberals and many who would otherwise be
<br>critics.
<br>His greatest value is not in pacifying critics in Europe. Powell has
<br>been the main interlocuter with European governments, who dearly
<br>wish he had more influence, but there is no sign that Bush
<br>particularly cares about courting continental European opinion. But
<br>keeping the allegiance of voices within the US which otherwise could
<br>cause trouble, particularly those in Congress, is essential for
<br>Bush. There is a lot of truth in this view, then, as there is in the
<br>affectionate gibe that Powell's real job title is "Ambassador to
<br>Georgetown".
<br>Still, it is not the whole picture. Even if from a supremely
<br>uncomfortable position, Powell has had some influence. He received a
<br>rebuff in November, when Bush announced his intention to walk out of
<br>the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, against Powell's
<br>strong urging, it is said. But Powell then turned his superior
<br>Russian connections to good advantage, brokering the recent
<br>arms-cuts deal with Putin, and gaining much of the credit for it.
<br>He has also been instrumental in checking Bush's desire to have an
<br>early attack on Iraq, as strongly suggested by the "axis of evil"
<br>speech. In this, he has had unexpected allies, in the form of many
<br>of the military chiefs, who are said to be deeply perturbed by the
<br>practical problems of trying to topple Saddam.
<br>Next week will be the biggest test of his influence, as he has so
<br>identified himself with trying to restart a Middle East peace
<br>process. It is impossible for Bush to reconcile his advisers'
<br>incomptible views; he will have to begin to choose, more than he has
<br>yet had to do in any area of policy. But there lies the heart of the
<br>problem: the President's reluctance, so far, to adjudicate in these
<br>rows, or to identify himself indubitably with one side or the other.
<br>Never mind Powell: next week, in fact the next six months of foreign
<br>policy, will prove a harsh test of the President himself. The action
<br>he wants most clearly, attacking Iraq, is problematic. The step he
<br>least wants to take, becoming engaged in a Middle East peace
<br>process, he must now face.
<br>Most serious, the risk that he didn't think he could possibly run
<br>now looks like the situation that is hardest to avoid: the failure
<br>to catch Osama bin Laden, the failure to oust Saddam Hussein, in
<br>short, failure to prosecute to any conclusion the War on Terror, the
<br>single defining theme of his presidency. His speech-writers must be
<br>looking forward nervously to the State of the Union address this
<br>coming January.
<br>What they will have to conceal is not just the lack of success, but
<br>the proliferation of confusion, from the President's attempt to
<br>agree with all of his headstrong, warring advisers. If he can't
<br>bring peace to the battle between the Pentagon and State Department,
<br>there is small hope for the Middle East.
<br>
</body>
]]>