MER - The NIE Report: Solving a Geopolitical Problem with Iran

<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF"> The NIE Report: Solving a Geopolitical Problem with Iran <br> <br>By George Friedman - Stratfor - Strategic Forecasting, Inc. <br>GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT 12.03.2007 <br> <br>The United States released a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on <br>Dec. 3. It said, "We judge with high confidence that in the fall of 2003, <br>Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." It went on to say, "Tehran's <br>decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined <br>to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005." It further <br>said, "Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in <br>response to international pressure indicates Tehran's decisions are guided <br>by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of <br>the political, economic and military costs." <br> <br>With this announcement, the dynamics of the Middle Eastern region, Iraq and <br>U.S.-Iranian relations shift dramatically. For one thing, the probability of <br>a unilateral strike against Iranian nuclear targets is gone. Since there is <br>no Iranian nuclear weapons program, there is no rationale for a strike. <br>Moreover, if Iran is not engaged in weapons production, then a broader air <br>campaign designed to destabilize the Iranian regime has no foundation <br>either. <br> <br>The NIE release represents a transformation of U.S. policy toward Iran. The <br>Bush administration made Iran's nuclear weapons program the main reason for <br>its attempt to create an international coalition against Iran, on the <br>premise that a nuclear-armed Iran was unacceptable. If there is no Iranian <br>nuclear program, then what is the rationale for the coalition? Moreover, <br>what is the logic of resisting Iran's efforts in Iraq, rather than <br>cooperating? <br> <br>In looking at the report, a number of obvious questions come up. First, how <br>did the intelligence community reach the wrong conclusion in the spring of <br>2005, when it last released an NIE on Iran, and what changed by 2007? Also, <br>why did the United States reach the wrong conclusions on Iran three years <br>after its program was halted? There are two possible answers. One is <br>intelligence failure and the other is political redefinition. Both must be <br>explored. <br> <br>Let's begin with intelligence failure. Intelligence is not an easy task. <br>Knowing what is going on inside of a building is harder than it might seem. <br>Regardless of all the technical capabilities -- from imagery in all spectra <br>to sensing radiation leakage at a distance -- huge uncertainties always <br>remain. Failing to get a positive reading does not mean the facility is not <br>up and running. It might just have been obscured, or the technical means to <br>discover it are insufficient. The default setting in technical intelligence <br>is that, while things can be ruled in, they cannot simply be ruled out by <br>lack of evidence. <br> <br>You need to go into the building. Indeed, you need to go into many <br>buildings, look around, see what is happening and report back. Getting into <br>highly secure buildings may be easy in the movies. It is not easy in real <br>life. Getting someone into the building who knows what he is seeing is even <br>harder. Getting him out alive to report back, and then repeating the process <br>in other buildings, is even harder. It can be done -- though not easily or <br>repeatedly. <br> <br>Recruiting someone who works in the building is an option, but at the end of <br>the day you have to rely on his word as to what he saw. That too, is a risk. <br>He might well be a double agent who is inventing information to make money, <br>or he could just be wrong. There is an endless number of ways that <br>recruiting on-site sources can lead you to the wrong conclusion. <br> <br>Source-based intelligence would appear to be the only way to go. Obviously, <br>it is better to glean information from someone who knows what is going on, <br>rather than to guess. But the problem with source-based intelligence is <br>that, when all is said and done, you can still be just as confused -- or <br>more confused -- than you were at the beginning. You could wind up with a <br>mass of intelligence that can be read either way. It is altogether possible <br>to have so many sources, human and technical, that you have no idea what the <br>truth is. That is when an intelligence organization is most subject to <br>political pressure. When the intelligence could go either way, politics can <br>tilt the system. We do not know what caused the NIE to change its analysis. <br>It could be the result of new, definitive intelligence, or existing <br>intelligence could have been reread from a new political standpoint. <br> <br>Consider the politics. The assumption was that Iran wanted to develop <br>nuclear weapons -- though its motivations for wanting to do so were never <br>clear to us. First, the Iranians had to assume that, well before they had an <br>operational system, the United States or Israel would destroy it. In other <br>words, it would be a huge effort for little profit. Second, assume that it <br>developed one or two weapons and attacked Israel, for example. Israel might <br>well have been destroyed, but Iran would probably be devastated by an <br>Israeli or U.S. counterstrike. What would be the point? <br> <br>For Iran to be developing nuclear weapons, it would have to have been <br>prepared to take extraordinary risks. A madman theory, centered around the <br>behavior of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was essential. But as the NIE <br>points out, Iran was "guided by a cost-benefit approach." In simple terms, <br>the Iranians weren't nuts. That is why they didn't build a nuclear program. <br> <br>That is not to say Iran did not benefit from having the world believe it was <br>building nuclear weapons. The United States is obsessed with nuclear weapons <br>in the hands of states it regards as irrational. By appearing to be <br>irrational and developing nuclear weapons, the Iranians created a valuable <br>asset to use in negotiating with the Americans. The notion of a nuclear <br>weapon in Iranian hands appeared so threatening that the United States might <br>well negotiate away other things -- particularly in Iraq -- in exchange for <br>a halt of the program. Or so the Iranians hoped. Therefore, while they <br>halted development on their weapons program, they were not eager to let the <br>Americans relax. They swung back and forth between asserting their right to <br>operate the program and denying they had one. Moreover, they pushed hard for <br>a civilian power program, which theoretically worried the world less. It <br>drove the Americans up a wall -- precisely where the Iranians wanted them. <br> <br>As we have argued, the central issue for Iran is not nuclear weapons. It is <br>the future of Iraq. The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 was the defining moment <br>in modern Iranian history. It not only devastated Iran, but also weakened <br>the revolution internally. Above all, Tehran never wants to face another <br>Iraqi regime that has the means and motivation to wage war against Iran. <br>That means the Iranians cannot tolerate a Sunni-dominated government that is <br>heavily armed and backed by the United States. Nor, for that matter, does <br>Tehran completely trust Iraq's fractured Shiite bloc with Iran's national <br>security. Iran wants to play a critical role in defining the nature, <br>policies and capabilities of the Iraqi regime. <br> <br>The recent U.S. successes in Iraq, however limited and transitory they might <br>be, may have caused the Iranians to rethink their view on dealing with the <br>Americans on Iraq. The Americans, regardless of progress, cannot easily <br>suppress all of the Shiite militias. The Iranians cannot impose a regime on <br>Iraq, though they can destabilize the process. A successful outcome requires <br>a degree of cooperation -- and recent indications suggest that Iran is <br>prepared to provide that cooperation. <br> <br>That puts the United States in an incredibly difficult position. On the one <br>hand, it needs Iran for the endgame in Iraq. On the other, negotiating with <br>Iran while it is developing nuclear weapons runs counter to fundamental U.S. <br>policies and the coalition it was trying to construct. As long as Iran was <br>building nuclear weapons, working with Iran on Iraq was impossible. <br> <br>The NIE solves a geopolitical problem for the United States. Washington <br>cannot impose a unilateral settlement on Iraq, nor can it sustain forever <br>the level of military commitment it has made to Iraq. There are other fires <br>starting to burn around the world. At the same time, Washington cannot work <br>with Tehran while it is building nuclear weapons. Hence, the NIE: While Iran <br>does have a nuclear power program, it is not building nuclear weapons. <br> <br>Perhaps there was a spectacular and definitive intelligence breakthrough <br>that demonstrated categorically that the prior assessments were wrong. <br>Proving a negative is tough, and getting a definitive piece of intelligence <br>is hard. Certainly, no matter how definitive the latest intelligence might <br>have been, a lot of people want Iran to be building a nuclear weapon, so the <br>debate over the meaning of this intelligence would have roared throughout <br>the intelligence community and the White House. Keeping such debate this <br>quiet and orderly is not Washington's style. <br> <br>Perhaps the Iranians are ready to deal, and so decided to open up their <br>facility for the Americans to see. Still, regardless of what the Iranians <br>opened up, some would have argued that the United States was given a tour <br>only of what the Iranians wanted them to see. There is a mention in the <br>report that any Iranian program would be covert rather than overt, and that <br>might reflect such concerns. However, all serious nuclear programs are <br>always covert until they succeed. Nothing is more vulnerable than an <br>incomplete nuclear program. <br> <br>We are struck by the suddenness of the NIE report. Explosive new <br>intelligence would have been more hotly contested. We suspect two things. <br>First, the intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program consisted of a great <br>number of pieces, many of which were inherently ambiguous and could be <br>interpreted in multiple ways. Second, the weight of evidence for there being <br>an Iranian nuclear program was shaded by the political proclivities of the <br>administration, which saw the threat of a U.S. strike as intimidating Iran, <br>and the weapons program discussion as justifying it. Third, the change in <br>political requirements on both sides made a new assessment useful. This last <br>has certainly been the case in all things Middle Eastern these past few days <br>on issues ranging from the Palestinians to Syria to U.S. forces in Iraq -- <br>so why should this issue be any different? <br> <br>If this thesis is correct, then we should start seeing some movement on Iraq <br>between the United States and Iran. Certainly the major blocker from the <br>U.S. side has been removed and the success of U.S. policies of late should <br>motivate the Iranians. In any case, the entire framework for U.S.-Iranian <br>relations would appear to have shifted, and with it the structure of <br>geopolitical relations throughout the region. <br> <br>Intelligence is rarely as important as when it is proven wrong. <br> <br> <b on></b> </body>